LO O K O FSK Y __FM T4.D OC

11/19/2008 4:37:13 PM

DESPARATELY SEEKING SUBSIDIARITY:
DANISH PRIVATE LAW IN THE
SCANDINAVIAN, EUROPEAN, AND GLOBAL
CONTEXT
JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY*
THE SIXTH ANNUAL HERBERT L. BERNSTEIN MEMORIAL
LECTURE IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
AS HELD AT DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
NOVEMBER 13, 2007
NOTE FROM THE EDITOR
In this volume the DJCIL is pleased to publish Professor Joseph
Lookofsky's Bernstein Memorial Lecture held last November at Duke
University School of Law, as well as the introductory remarks
presented on that occasion by Dean David Levi and Professor Paul
Haagen.
The text which follows the introductions consists mainly of a
verbatim transcription of Professor Lookofsky's lecture. However,
since his lecture at Duke was enhanced by a series of graphic (onscreen) illustrations, the DJCIL editors and Professor Lookofsky have
found it appropriate to edit and adjust selected passages in the
transcription, so as to retain the gist of the illustrations and thus the
essence of the original lecture. Readers can also (re)experience the
lecture in its original form, including its graphics, at [http://www.law
.duke.edu/webcast?match=Bernstein+Memorial+Lecture].

* Joseph Lookofsky is Professor of Obligations, Commercial Law and Private
International Law at the University of Copenhagen. See http://jur.ku.dk/josephlookofsky/.
Professor Lookofsky wishes to express his sincere appreciation to Professor Henning Koch (of
the University of Copenhagen) and Professor Peter Møgelvang-Hansen (of the Copenhagen
Business School) for their valuable comments and suggestions in connection with the
preparation of the Bernstein Memorial Lecture at Duke.
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DEAN DAVID F. LEVI**
Welcome to the Sixth Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial
Lecture. This lecture series celebrates the life's work of Professor
Bernstein, who was a wonderful teacher, scholar and colleague at
Duke Law School for 17 years before he passed away in 2001.
Born in Hamburg, Professor Bernstein had a harrowing boyhood
during World War II. He was educated at the University of Hamburg,
distinguished himself as a practitioner and scholar of the law at an
early age, and eventually made his way to the University of Michigan
Law School in 1962. He then taught at the Universities of Hamburg,
Berkeley, and Southampton before coming to Duke in 1984. His
fields of scholarship included comparative and private international
law.
Professor Bernstein was a much beloved figure here at Duke.
Because I did not have the privilege of knowing him personally, I've
talked to others who did, and certain words and phrases constantly
recur. People recall his respect for others, his warmth, his kindness,
that he was a gentleman of the old school, his commitment to justice,
his wonderful sense of humor. It's clear that he had a profound effect
on all of those who were fortunate enough to come to know him.
It's a particular pleasure to see that his wife, Professor
Bernstein's wife, Waltraud Bernstein is able to be with us here today.
Thank you for coming.
This speaker series is made possible by the Duke Center for
Comparative & International Law as well as by contributions from
Professor Bernstein's many friends and from the alumni of this law
school, and we are grateful to all of those who have made possible
this wonderful event.
We are honored to welcome here to Duke one who is no stranger
to Duke. Professor Joseph Lookofsky of the University of
Copenhagen will be delivering the Bernstein Lecture today. A friend
and colleague of Professor Bernstein, it is fit and proper that he
should be our speaker here today. Introducing Professor Lookofsky
is our own Professor Paul Haagen. Professor Haagen is a scholar of
history and law. He was a Rhodes scholar. He holds a Ph.D in history
from Princeton and a J.D. from Yale. He joined our law school in
1985. His scholarship focuses on contacts and arbitration, particularly
in the professional sports arena, as well as in the social history of law.
** Dean David F. Levi is Dean and Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
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He's particularly interested in debtors and debtor's prison. Professor
Haagen.
PROFESSOR PAUL H. HAAGEN***
And I am indebted to Dean Levi for those comments. As Dean
Levi noted, this is the Sixth Herbert Bernstein Memorial Lecture in
International and Comparative law. It is a series that gives those of us
who knew and had the privilege to work with Herbert a time and
opportunity to reflect on his many contributions to this institution and
to the field of international and comparative law.
Herbert was a wonderful colleague, a man of penetrating
intellect, grace, dignity and deep humanity. It's a great honor and
privilege to introduce and welcome back to Duke Law School Joseph
Lookofsky, Professor of Obligations and private International Law at
the University of Copenhagen, and among his many other
accomplishments, Herbert Bernstein's distinguished co-author,
collaborator and friend.
Professor Lookofsky's education and experience are in many
ways the mirror image of Professor Bernstein's. Professor Bernstein,
as the Dean has noted, was educated first in Kiel and then in
Hamburg before beginning a distinguished academic and professional
career in German law. He then came to the United States to study
American law at Michigan and teach American contract and
insurance law here. He brought to comparative law the expertise of a
scholar and practitioner at home in both the common and civil law
traditions.
Professor Lookofsky has taken the opposite and, I suspect, more
difficult and less common route to a similar expertise. Educated at
Lehigh University and the New York University School of Law, he
practiced law as an in-house counsel at United Artists before going to
Denmark to study law at the University of Copenhagen, where he
joined the faculty in 1981. Professor Lookofsky has been a visiting
professor at the Universität Freiburg Institut für Internationales
Privatrecht and here at Duke Law School. In addition to serving as
Secretary General for the Danish Committee for Comparative Law,
Professor Lookofsky coordinates student exchange programs with
Duke Law School and the New York University Law School.

*** Paul Haagen is Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
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I believe alone among the Bernstein lecturers, and probably
among this audience as well, Professor Lookofsky has the distinction
of being a member of a chivalric order, having been awarded the
Order of the Dannebrog by Her Majesty Queen Margrethe II of
Denmark in September of this year for his distinguished service to
Denmark. Professor Lookofsky's teaching and publications relate to
contractual and delictual obligations, sales, private international law,
commercial arbitration, and comparative law. His lecture today is
entitled "Desperately Seeking Subsidiarity: Danish private Law in the
Scandinavian, European, and Global Context."
Subsidiarity is a principle of European Community Law first
established and defined in Article 5 of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.
It is intended to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible
to the citizen, and that the community can only take action if and
insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the member states. It is somewhat similar, Professor
Lookofsky has noted, to the principles set out in the Tenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. He will explain why he and
other Danish jurists are seeking but not finding subsidiarity in the
private law field. Professor Lookofsky.
PROFESSOR JOSEPH M. LOOKOFSKY
Thank you very much, Paul, for that kind and very generous
introduction.
Dean Levi, colleagues, students and friends: Thank you for this
great honor to lecture at this fine law school today in memory of my
dear friend and colleague Herbert Bernstein. This is my fifth visit
here, and I have wonderful memories.
Last January Dean Levi's predecessor, Dean Bartlett, invited me
to come here to Duke to lecture comparatively, in Herbert's honor,
on a topic in Danish or Scandinavian law. In response to that kind
invitation, I will speak about subsidiarity, mainly within the context of
Danish, Scandinavian and European private law. Thank you, Paul, for
helping to me to introduce the subsidiarity concept. That will save me
a bit of time during the first part of my lecture.
Now, to help introduce the comparative context of my lecture, I
ask you to imagine a map composed of concentric circles or rings, a
map which depicts the "private law universe."
At the center of this universe, within the innermost circle of this
map, lies the private law of Denmark. Just outside this, the map's
second ring depicts private law applicable in all of Scandinavia, in
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particular, certain private law rule-sets known as the Scandinavian
"Model Laws."
Both of these inner rings are surrounded by a third ring which
1
represents the law of the European Union, and this ring is the one in
which the concept of subsidiarity lies.
Finally, we imagine the outermost "global private law" ring,
which comprises certain private law rule-sets adhered to not only by
European States, but also by many non-European countries,
including (e.g.) the United States and China. Within this last ring we
find such commercially significant treaties as the Convention on the
International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the New York Convention
on International Commercial Arbitration.
This map serves to depict my private law universe, and it's not so
unusual that I see things from my own location and perspective. After
all, I've been in Denmark for some thirty five years, and so Denmark
is the center of my universe, not only as regards private law, but as
also as regards life and society in general. I realize that might be hard
for an American audience to understand, since I was born and lived
here in the United States for twenty seven years, but I have lived in
Denmark for an even longer period of time, and the center of my
universe shifted (or at least drifted) towards Scandinavia some time
ago.
As I proceed with my lecture, I'll ask you to keep my private law
universe in mind. I'll use Denmark (the innermost ring) as my starting
point and then work outwards. Before I tell you about Danish private
law, I'll say a few things about Danish society in general. I think these
observations about the societal context might make it easier to
explain some of the perhaps unusual concepts of Danish law which I
intend to mention later.
I will also make a few general points about Scandinavian law.
There are, to be sure, many similarities between Danish and
Scandinavian law, but there are also many differences. There is, in
fact, no real "Scandinavian Law," as there are no (regional)
2
Scandinavian rules which regulate conduct throughout Scandinavia,

1. The author notes that in a more perfect map of this "private-law universe" the third
ring would account for the fact that one of the Scandinavian States (Norway) is not a member of
the European Union.
2. A few Scandinavians once dreamed of "federalizing" Scandinavian private law. In 1947,
a prominent professor at the University of Copenhagen presented his Draft for a Nordic Civil
Code. Although the idea never took hold anywhere in Scandinavia, his Draft was later
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but we do have some similar private law legislation in Denmark,
Norway and Sweden, because these statutes were originally drafted
on the basis of models which reflect a Scandinavian consensus. So,
just as parts of the New Jersey version of the UCC closely resemble
the corresponding parts New York or North Carolina law, because
they were all drafted on the basis of a uniform model, we find parts of
Danish private law which resemble parts of Norwegian and Swedish
private law.
But my main focus today will be a comparison between Danish
and European law. That will be the main comparative context. I think
many of the things I say will also invite other comparisons in your
own (American) minds, but I must say that from a Danish point of
view the main comparative interest these days is the relationship
between Danish law as such and European Community law (which is
of course becoming part of Danish law as well), as opposed to
comparisons between Danish and American law. But, as I'm here in
the United States today, I will also make some comparative
comments in that American law direction as well.
There is a trend towards what I permit myself to call the
"federalization" of Private law in Europe. The word "federalization"
is in quotation marks here in my notes, since some constitutional
scholars in Europe would debate or contest the validity of that term,
at least technically speaking, but there's no question that some key
areas of private law that were previously the exclusive province of the
Danish legislator and part of Danish sovereignty have been
federalized and have become (or been replaced by) European law
common to all Member-States of the European Union, and Denmark
is, of course, one of these States.
I will be illustrating this point as I go along and explaining with
concrete examples—as many as I have time for—and at the end of my
lecture I even hope to reach some global comparisons (the outermost
ring on my map). These comparisons will be few and brief: one is
about arbitration—the New York Convention on Arbitration, and the
other one is about the International Sales Convention, the CISG,
since I hope to say a few words regarding Denmark's special position
in relation to these two significant treaties.
Well, I don't have to tell you what "subsidiarity" means, since
Paul [Haagen] did that for me, but you might still ask why I (or

published in English. See FR. VINDING KRUSE, A NORDIC DRAFT CODE (Else Giersing trans.,
Munksgaard 1963).
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anybody) might be desperately seeking that? Well, a lot of people are
desperately seeking something these days. Indeed, when I Googled
3
the words "desperately seeking," I got more than two million hits. A
large number of them, it seems, were related to the film entitled
Desperately Seeking Susan (with Susan played by Madonna, herself) –
that film was, by the way, one of the "top ten" films of 1985.4
And then there are the many others, those desperately seeking
other things—everything from snoozin' (a good night's sleep) to
sanity.
But why seek subsidiarity? Well, if you search for the term in
Google (one of the great sources of law these days actually), you'll
see that subsidiarity had its origins in Catholic Church doctrine from
the late 1800's. So, even the Church once sought subsidiarity. And
though this information (subsidiarity's religious origin) is actually
quite interesting,5 I won't take the time right now to say more about
that.
Instead, I'd like to discuss what subsidiarity means in the
European Union context. As you said, Paul, the term became
prominent in 1992, around the same time that the European
Community was moving towards (developing into) the European
Union. I think it's fair to say that subsidiarity, as it was used then, was
a kind of signal to the peoples of Europe who thought (and feared)
that Europe was harmonizing too quickly, becoming one single
"State." To counter (or slow down) that trend, the European
Community, and later the Union, could "put the brakes on," if you
will, by using the subsidiarity concept.
In Danish we "translate" (or re-write) the term subsidiarity to
6
something we call—get ready—"nærhedsprincippet." This is
(literally) the "closeness-principle," the idea that decisions should be
taken as closely as possible to the citizens. I think that (our own freely
translated) version serves to explain the ideological aspect of
subsidiarity.

3. Google, http://www.google.com/ (search "desperately seeking") (last visited Oct. 5,
2008).
4. RogerEbert.com, Movie Answer Man, http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/arti
cle?A ID=/20070816/ANSWERMAN/70817006/1023 (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
5. Interested readers can easily obtain a wealth of information on this subject. See, e.g.,
Google, http://www.google.com/ (search "subsidiarity, Catholic Church") (last visited Oct. 5,
2008).
6. Pronounced in Danish (something) like this: nair–heds–prin–seep–it.
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And then we have the more technical, "constitutional" aspect of
subsidiarity, and this is the idea that the European Union does not (or
at least should not) take action unless such (centralized/federalized/
European) action is deemed to be more effective than action taken at
7
the national level. The Union should, in other words, not go beyond
what is "necessary."
But even that, I would venture to say (and I'm not a
constitutional scholar), is also at the moment a kind of an ideological
concept. It's just a signal; it hasn't really "put the brakes on."
Denmark did, to be sure, send a shockwave through the Community
by voting "No" to the Union in 1992, and for a brief period our "no"
put the brakes on the entire unionization of Europe. So it was
perhaps then appropriate that the European Council sent the signal
of subsidiarity, saying: "Don't worry Denmark; we're not going to
take over more than is absolutely necessary in terms of federalizing
European law."
The more recent (draft) European Constitution – which was
subsequently renamed the (draft) Reform Treaty (to make it sound
less "federal," I suppose)—includes provisions purportedly enhancing
8
the principle of subsidiarity. As expressed in the Treaty on the
9
European Union, the principle "is intended to ensure that decisions
are taken as closely as possible to the citizen and that constant checks
are made as to whether action at Community level is justified in the
light of the possibilities available at the national, regional or local
level."10
Together with this new version of the subsidiarity principle, the
Reform Treaty establishes an "Early Warning System," which gives
the individual EU Member States the chance to say: "Wait, please
don't federalize that, if you are going in that direction." Essentially,
the warning system permits national parliaments to "ask the

7. Except in the areas within its "exclusive competence", see Europa Glossary,
http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/subsidiarity_en.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2008), and we can
leave that exception alone, since it does not concern us here today.
8. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Protocol on the Application of the Principles of
Subsidiarity and Proportionality, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 150, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007 :306:SOM:EN:HTML [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty].
9. See also Treaty on European Union, tit. II, art. G(B)(5), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191)
1, amended by Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, art. 5, para. 2, Oct. 2, 1997,
1997 O.J. (C 340) 57.
10. See generally Europa Glossary, supra note 7.
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Commission to review a legislative proposal if they consider that it
11
violates the principle."
Well, as I said, I am going to be looking at this from the point of
view of a "private" lawyer, and since the term "private law" (in
Danish: privatret) sounds more European than American, I'll try to
explain it this way: Private law is, quite simply, what I do. It's not a
strange thing. In some legal systems, I should say, the distinction
between private and public law has technical and important
significance. We have a scholar here today, Ralf Michaels, who has
12
written about that, and all I want to say is that in Denmark the
distinction is of no particular significance. It's just a convenient
division of labor among faculty members. Some "do" private law and
some public law. People who do public law concern themselves with
constitutional law, criminal law, administrative law, whereas the
people who do private law do things like contracts, torts and
property. I "do" obligations and that includes contractual obligations,
as well as delictual obligations (the things you call torts), and I also do
private international law and comparative law as they relate to
contract and tort.
Now, that is a non-American way of doing things, I think. In the
United States, and even in much of Europe, private international law,
also known as conflicts of law, is something that is done by specialists,
and I think that we have some of those specialists with us today. In
Europe, in Denmark at least, it is not uncommon for the person doing
contracts to be responsible for comparing (e.g.) Danish contract law
to the contract law of other legal systems—contracts in German law,
American law etc.—and also to address related conflict-of-laws
matters, including the applicable law (choice of law). So I do these
things too. It's a system (division of labor) which has both advantages
and disadvantages, which I won't go into now. I just wanted to explain
what I mean by private law when I talk about it.
And now I would like to take you on an imaginary trip, a tour
from the Duke University Law School, located on Science Drive in
Durham North Carolina, to the place I work in Copenhagen, which is
on Studiestræde (that means "Study Street," which is quite similar to
the German term).

11. See Europa Glossary, Together 50 Years - Subsidiarity, http://www.together50years.eu/
EN/gloss/index.htm.
12. See generally Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State?
Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843 (2006).
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There are, of course, various ways to get to Denmark from Duke.
If you were to go eastward, as the crows or jets fly, towards what is
now the tiny Kingdom of Denmark, you would pass by parts of the
formerly enormous Kingdom of Denmark. We ruled Greenland
(which we still "rule," though they wouldn't like me to say it that way;
they now have "home rule"). Denmark also ruled most of Norway
and even part of Sweden at one time. It was indeed an enormous
kingdom, and a mighty one – you know, the Vikings and all of that.
But, we could also approach Denmark from the south, which I
think is more interesting today, because if we came up that way, the
way the Roman Legions did, we would pass through what is now the
German Duchy of Schleswig, and we would pass the Eider River. But
if we did what the Romans did, we would actually stop at the Eider,
because there is (or at least was) a stone there saying (excuse my
Latin): Eidora Romani Terminus Imperii, (i.e.) "The Roman Empire
13
Stops Here."
And that inscription remains significant today, because the "Civil
law" stops there, too. And it is incorrect, although a common error, to
include Scandinavian law within the Civil law group of law families.
There are, to be sure, numerous similarities between Scandinavian
and Civil law; many of them came afterwards, when we stole or
borrowed or imitated a lot of German principles in certain fields,
including private law. But the Scandinavian States never adopted the
super-structure of the Civil law system, and that fact might help you
understand some of the things I am going to say about the
Scandinavian position on the world comparative map, and more
specifically, the Danish position.
Before moving further in that direction, however, I thought that
it might be appropriate to say something about the societal context,
"where I'm coming from," if you will, after living and working in
Denmark for some 35 years.
Denmark is the oldest kingdom in the world. It was originally
14
ruled by King Knud (his Danish name was later translated as
"Canute") and the Viking tribe that he led. And the term "tribe" is
still used about the Danish people, because Denmark is such a tightly
knit society, such a small and nearly homogeneous society that it is

13. See, e.g., Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org/ (search "Eider River") (last visited Oct.
5, 2008).
14. Pronounced: Keh-nood (as in "noodle").
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often figuratively speaking described as a tribe. And I'll give you
some examples of that.
Today, we're not only a kingdom; we're also a modern Welfare
State. That's Welfare with a capital "W" (welfare is not a dirty word
for us).
And ours is also an extremely Democratic society (another key
Danish word). Today, as fate would have it, there is a parliamentary
15
election in Denmark. It is a very closely contested election, and it
looks like we are going to go over 85% in terms of voter turnout,
which is going to break the Danish record. And that is also the
highest voter-participation in the world, if we exclude the countries
where you must vote (by law).
So, we are going to break our own record today. And when we
do that, 98% of the people who cast their votes will be represented by
16
politicians with seats in the Danish Parliament (Folketing). It is not a
winner-take-all system, which is not so unusual for parliamentary
democracies, but it is unusual when the cutoff or borderline is as low
as 2%, as it is in Denmark, and that means that nearly everyone in
Denmark is represented in Parliament by someone who shares his or
her political view, and that fact, some of us think, may contribute to
the very peaceful nature of the Danish society. If people want to "do
battle" and argue about things, they do it in the Parliament and not
on the streets.
Well, what else should I say about Danish society? Other key
words on my list here include Compromise, Realism, and
Pragmatism. I'll be returning to these concepts, but I should also
mention Secularity: Denmark might well be the least religious
country in the world. Don't be fooled by the large symbol on the
Danish flag; ours is a very secular society. We don't have politicians
talking about religion during our elections, at least not in the sense of
17
wearing their religion (if they have one) on their sleeves.

15. The election in Denmark was held on the same date as this Bernstein Memorial
Lecture at Duke University School of Law: 13 November 2007.
16. See Folketinget, http://www.folketinget.dk (follow "English" hyperlink) (last visited
Oct. 5, 2008).
17. See generally PAUL ZUCKERMAN, SOCIETY WITHOUT GOD: WHAT THE LEAST
RELIGIOUS NATIONS CAN TELL US ABOUT CONTENTMENT (2008). During a press conference
televised on Danish public television on 28 February 2007, the Danish Prime Minister said: "In
my opinion, we should have less religion in the public space (det offentlige rum)." Fogh Strongly
Condemns Religious Særhensyn, DR NYHEDER, Feb. 28, 2007, http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/
Politik/2007/02/28/113931.htm. See John Hansen & Kim Hundevadt, The Cartoon Crisis—How
It Unfolded, UDLAND.JP.DK, Mar. 11, 2008, http://jp.dk/udland/article1292543.ece (regarding
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We also have great Prosperity in Denmark. The Danish Kroner
is strong (we don't have the Euro, but we have linked ourselves firmly
18
to it). And we have a concept called Flexicurity, which even the
French are thinking about imitating: security and flexibility in the job
market. We have "S & M" as well: do you know what that is?
Socialized Medicine! And we are happy about that. We don't really
call it that; we just call it the Healthcare System.19 But everyone in
Denmark is covered by it, and it works fairly well.
Sharing, Honesty and Happiness. We are also "number one" in
20
these categories. Denmark is on top in Sharing in the sense of having
the smallest disparity between rich and poor in the world (closely
followed by, I think, Bangladesh, which it is of course on a different
21
scale). Denmark also has lots of Honesty, in the sense that we have –
according to the people who do these surveys, I don't know how they
do them – the least corruption in the world.22 And then there's
Happiness: how do they measure that? Well, however they measure
23
it, they tell us that we are the happiest people in the world. Some
have contested that and said: "Well, you Danes don't have very high
expectations; that's why."
We are also "number one" is some other categories, including—
this is the downside I guess— Taxation. Of course, you need high
Taxation (and Sharing) to get the very, very small disparity between
the wealthy and the poor; we have, in fact, no "poor" in Denmark in
the sense that you (in America) understand poor. That is the result of
heavy taxation, heavily progressive heavy taxation. But Danish
the Danish "Cartoon Crisis", which engendered considerable political debate in Denmark and
elsewhere, both about religion and freedom of speech).
18. See, e.g., Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org/ (search "Flexicurity") (last visited Oct.
5, 2008).
19. In Danish: Sundhedssystemmet.
20. According to various surveys easily accessible in Google. See infra notes 21-23 and
accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Financial Security–Income Distribution, http://www4.hrsdc.gc.ca/indicator.jsp?
lang=en&indicatorid=22 (last visited Oct. 5, 2008) (describing the Gini coefficient, which
measures income disparity, ranged from 22.5 for Denmark to 48 for Mexico).
22. Tied for first place with Finland and New Zealand. Infoplease, The 2006 Transparency
International Corruption Perceptions Index, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781359.html (last
visited Oct. 5, 2008) (providing the 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index scores). See also
Christian Bjørnskov, Combating Corruption: On the Interplay Between Institutional Quality
and Social Trust (unpublished and undated manuscript, on file with the author).
23. This has been the case for several years running. See Denmark 'Happiest' Country in
the World, CNN, July 2, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/07/02/nations.happiness/;
Denmark 'Happiest Place on Earth,' BBC NEWS, July 28, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk
/2/hi/5224306.stm.

LOOKOFSKY__FMT4.DOC

2008]

11/19/2008 4:37:13 PM

DESPERATELY SEEKING SUBSIDIARITY

173

people pay it willingly, and the voting (in the Parliamentary election)
today is not about whether we should have less taxes, but rather
about whether we should reorganize the taxes.
Moonlighting is another negative: it seems we have the highest
24
rate of moonlighting in the civilized world. Teenage Drinking – we
have a lot of that too. And then we have problems associated with
what I might label "Tribal Initiation." I'm not sure whether we are
first in that category, but we certainly have had a lot of publicity
about it, especially as regards "initiating" foreign newcomers as
Members of the Danish Tribe, which is, as I said, a societal system
characterized by high participatory Democracy and high Sharing
(redistribution of wealth). These things have been hard for some
newcomers to understand, and so it's been hard for them to become
Members of the Danish Tribe.25
Well, now that you know the societal background, or at least
something about it, I return to the subject of Danish private law. My
first Danish private law book was a book about called "Den
Borgerlige Ret." This was in 1975, in my first course in elementary
Danish contract law. This was my first "hornbook," if you will. I have
it with me here today, and I'd like to translate one sentence in it. It
says this: "Article 1 (§ 1) of the Danish Contracts Act lays down the
fundamental rule that promises and contracts are legally binding."
I read that a few times in 1975: "Promises – and therefore also
contracts – are legally binding." And then I began another kind of
desperate search, desperately seeking (but not finding) some key
concepts I had learned during my American legal education, things
26
like "consideration," writing requirements and other formalities.
And if you searched today (instead of in 1975) you might, as an
American-educated jurist, also look for (but not find) the Law and
Economics concept of "efficient breach."

24. Also sometimes referred to as the "black economy". The Danish Tax Department
considers "[m]oonlighting [to be] when you are offered and accept a job where neither you nor
your employer informs SKAT [the Tax Authorities] about the employment and the pay you
receive." SKAT, TAX IN DENMARK, 18 (2005) available at http://www.skat.dk/Vejledninger/
Personserien/Pnr_37_eng2005.pdf.
25. Author's note: Lest I be accused of jingoism, I'll readily admit that my lecturestatement on this point oversimplifies a complex set of related problems—some of them also
attributable to the way some Native (born-in-Denmark) Tribal Members treat newcomers to
Danish territory.
26. E.g. Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org/ (search "consideration") (last visited Oct. 5,
2008) (defining consideration as the "value paid for a promise").
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Well, I searched for some of these things in 1975, but I found
none of them. There is no consideration requirement in Danish law.
Indeed, there are, quite simply no formalities at all. No contract needs
to be "supported" by consideration, nor does any contract need to in
writing.
Nor do many Danish jurists concern themselves with "efficient
breach," not even today, and there are several reasons for this. There
happens to be an article in the American Journal of Comparative
Law this month which explains why many Civil law systems are not
27
interested in efficient breach. I won't go into that in detail, but I will
say that the core explanation for us is that promises are not only
"legally binding" in Denmark; they are also morally binding, and so
how could Danish lawyers go out and encourage people to
(efficiently) breach their promises? It would not work very well.
So, in our "homemade" (pre-EC and pre-EU) version of Danish
private law, promises are binding, period, Well, at least all reasonable
promises are binding, because there's another rule in the Contracts
28
Act which guards against unreasonable contract terms. That too
applies to all contracts: consumer contracts, contracts between
merchants, whatever. There are, to be sure, weak and strong
merchants, and the prohibition against unreasonable terms, including
promises which would be unreasonable to enforce, is applied more
restrictively as between merchants, but it's there and it's the same
rule.
As for our "homemade" law of Torts, I'll mention one principle
now, and I'll follow up with a more concrete illustration later.
Imagine that we have a defective product, and that a consumer who
buys that that product is injured. The seller of the product is liable
under Danish law. Why is the seller liable? Because the Danish
judges who make (judge-made) private law decided that he should be
liable. Is that a contractual principle? No, because the legislators who
29
wrote the Danish Sales Act more than 100 years ago were of the
opinion that contractual rules were not well-suited for product
liability cases. So even the immediate seller's liability is based on a
tort principle, but it's a (near) strict liability principle: you can sue the
27. Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Why No Efficient Breach in the Civil Law?: A Comparative
Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 721, 721 (2007).
28. See Aftalelov, 1986-96, § 36 (Den.) translated in http://www.sprog.asb.dk/sn
/Danish%20 Contracts%20Act.pdf [hereinafter Aftalelov].
29. Købeloven, (1906), as subsequently amended, translated in http://www.sprog.asb.dk/sn/
Danish%20Sale%20of%20Goods%20Act.pdf.
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seller with whom you have a contractual relationship –or even if you
don't, a member of your family can sue him – and the seller will be
held liable unless he can prove that the producer is (without fault and
therefore) not liable. This was at least the law made by our judges.
I'll return to a more concrete example, which illustrates how EU law
has changed our law in this area, in a minute.30
I realize that I'm presenting a rather abrupt list of rules, but I do
want to mention another private law rule now, one that applies to
both contract and tort, and that rule says: no unreasonable
compensation. Not only are unreasonable contract terms not binding
in Denmark, but even when a binding promise is broken, the party
injured is not necessarily entitled to full-blown "expectation
protection." There's a regulatory mechanism, codified by statute
actually, which limits compensation (in both contract and tort) to
31
what a Danish judge would consider to be a "reasonable" amount.
So, you see, the reasonableness-principle pervades Danish
private law. I have one nice illustration of the fact that unreasonable
contract terms do not bind. Our daughter Sarah is living in New York
now. She's going to be married in the Kingdom of Denmark this
summer, and she was in the process of contracting with a Danish
provider of services for her wedding. When she found the standard
terms of one prospective provider on line, she sent me an e-mail with
a link to them, asking: "Dad, can I click yes to this?". I answered her
without even looking: "Don't worry about that," I said, "because
even if there are any unreasonable terms in there, they're not
binding." So she clicked yes, and that was that.
I looked at those terms later, by the way, and they were quite
reasonable, from a Danish point of view. There was, for one thing, no
arbitration clause among them. Such a clause might not be
unreasonable per se in Denmark, but we simply don't have any
Danish merchants who include arbitration clauses in their consumer
contracts, probably because the merchants would not expect them to
bind. I think our general prohibition against unreasonable contract
terms reflects a more paternalistic attitude than the corresponding,
yet "milder" rule in the United States, i.e., the rule that
"unconscionable" promises are not binding. I think that

30. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
31. See Erstatningsansvarsloven [Liability for Damages Act], No. 885 (2005) (Den.) § 24,
translated in http://uk.patientforsikringen.dk/legislation/erstatningsansvarsloven.html [herein
after Erstatningsansvarsloven].
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"unreasonable" is, as it sounds, a more flexible and more intrusive
term than unconscionable. I wouldn't say that the difference is
enormous, but it certainly is a difference in spirit.
I think it's time to move on now and say something about the
sources of Danish private law - where do all these rules that I'm
talking about come from? These flexible and open-ended legal rules,
the sources of what I've been calling "home-made"(i.e.) Danish-made
private law.
First, I'd like to highlight the word for "law" in the Scandinavian
legal systems. The Scandinavian languages are very close on this
point: the word for law is "ret" in Danish, "rett" in Norwegian, and
"rät" in Swedish (we have a Swede here in the audience today: am I
doing this well?). Interestingly, all these versions of the word mean
more than just "law," they also mean right. The Scandinavian word
for law is the same as the Scandinavian word for right. There's
something nice about that. Maybe I'm being a bit sentimental, but I
think there's something nice about that.
What about statutes and legislative codifications? The word for
"law" can also be used to mean (a) "formal law" in the sense of a
legislative enactment, a statute. That helps explain why my heading
on this point is: Make love, not codes. I took a copyright on that
phrase (by tagging a © to it in my Power Point), because I thought it
was quite cute. (I used to be a copyright lawyer at United Artists
Corporation, you know.) Well, the fact is that the plural of the Danish
word for law happens to be "love," but this plural form is pronounced
– not like you pronounce "love" in English, but rather – as a twosyllable word: low – vuh. Say the word for law in the singular, and it's
pronounced "low." Say the plural, however, and you can hear the "v"
(in vuh).
But my main point here is that Danes make laws; they don't make
Codes. Danish legislators have been enacting statutes on private law
subjects for centuries, but they have never enacted a comprehensive
Civil Code. As I said earlier, the Roman Empire (and Roman law)
32
stopped at the Eider River, and that helps explain why we never got
a general Civil Code, as in France and Germany and other Civil law
systems. These days, when the European Union is moving, step by
step, towards a European Civil Code,33 we Danish jurists are nervous

32. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
33. See generally TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds., 3d
ed. 2004). The seemingly innocuous "Common Frame of Reference" is, in my view, just the first
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about that. We have never had a Code; we don't have the tradition
for it; and we are worried about it.
What we do have at the "home-made" level are a few basic
pieces of legislation within the private law area, the most notable
34
being the Danish Sales Act. It's quite similar in its coverage to
Article 2 of the American UCC.35 Another key Danish statute is the
Contracts Act, which has a broader field of application: it applies not
just to sales transactions; it also covers other contractual topics (which
the UCC covers with respect to sales), such as contract formation.
The prohibition against unreasonable contract terms, which I
mentioned previously,36 is in the Contracts Act.37 And then there's the
Liability for Damages Act,38 which tells judges how to measure
liability, particularly in tort cases. The Liability Act also contains the
general liability-limitation I told you about,39 so that plaintiffs don't
get unreasonable compensation (in contract or tort).
These, I think, are our main private law statutes. But we also
have judge-made law in Denmark. Indeed, since we have relatively
little (detailed) statutory regulation, we have to rely quite on a lot of
judge-made law. That probably doesn't surprise the American
audience here. But our judge-made law might well surprise a Civilian
jurist. We Danish jurists don't regard our judges as do the French, for
example, as the "bouche de la loi" – the mouthpiece of the (French)
legislature. Our Danish judges really make law, and everyone
recognizes it. But they make it in a way that is different from the way
it's made here in the States. It's made in a way that is less obvious.
For one thing, our judges write very brief decisions. The longest
part of a Danish judgment simply accounts for the facts of the case
and the arguments of the opposing lawyers. The decision itself and
the rationale underlying that decision – the ratio, sometimes also
referred to as the premises (præmisserne) - are very briefly stated,
usually fitting within a single paragraph. The premises need only send
a brief "signal" as regards the main factors that have gone into the

slice of the coming, fully codified pie. For recent developments, see, e.g., Study Group on a
European Civil Code, http://www.sgecc.net/pages/en/home/index.welcome.htm (last visited Oct.
5, 2008). See also infra notes 50, 69 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
35. U.C.C. art. 2 (2004).
36. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
37. See Aftalelov, supra note 28.
38. See Erstatningsansvarsloven, supra note 31.
39. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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judge's decision, because the judge is not trying to "set a precedent,"
he's trying to decide the concrete case.
I know a fair amount about this aspect of Danish law, because I
often work with judges. I work with them not only because Danish
judges also sometimes serve as arbitrators (and so I sometimes get to
sit on arbitration tribunals with them), but also because Danish
judges also serve as external examiners (censors), helping us grade
Danish law school exams. When we talk about the solutions to a
complicated problem on an essay exam in the law of contracts, for
example, or in the law of tort, the judges often have the outcome in
mind. These judges are, of course, not ignoring the applicable rules,
but it's not necessarily the rules that push them towards the outcome.
It's rather as if they first sense the outcome – what they feel is just and
right (which goes back to the fact that they too went to law school) –
and then they test that result by looking at the premises (the ratio –
which in an exam situation is set forth in the "model answer") to see
if the premises do indeed "lead" to that just result. Is that putting the
horse before the cart or the cart before the horse? I'm not sure. It's
something which Patrick Attiyah from England (I think he's been at
this law school as well), has called reasoning backwards. It's not a
concept to which we claim copyright, but it's something which we
40
adhere to in practice.
I think the result of all of this is that Danish private law is made
up of two main components, statutory law and judge-made law, each
in a special Danish variation, what you might call "legislation light"
and "precedent light." For these reasons, among others, the Danish
system is an unusual system.
I can see that I have to move along now if I want to get to some
concrete examples, so that I can illustrate how Danish law is
characterized by pragmatism as well as realism.
41
My first example, inspired by a real Danish case, concerns a guy
named Mr. Skov. He's a farmer who runs an egg business, producing
eggs. He sells the eggs to "Bilka", a large Danish supermarket (a bit
like Wal-Mart), and two consumers (named Jette and Michael) who
buy those eggs from Bilka make what Danes call an "egg cake." As it

40. See Joseph Lookofsky, The Limits of Commercial Contract Freedom: Under the
UNIDROIT 'Restatement' and Danish Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 485, 490 & n.33 (1998).
41. The facts here are inspired by Danish (City and High Court) decisions which led to the
preliminary ruling issued on 10 Jan. 2006 by the European Court of Justice. Case C-402/03, Skov
Æg v Bilka Lavprisvarehus, 2006 E.C.R. I-00199.
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turns out the eggs are tainted with salmonella, and the consumers
become seriously ill. Who can they sue?
Well, if we apply traditional (pre EC/EU) Danish judge-made
42
(pro-consumer) rules to decide this one, the consumers don't need
to locate the egg-producer (Mr. Skov, whose name isn't on the box
anyway). They just go right to the supermarket (Bilka) and let that
middleman-seller worry about who ultimately might be left holding
the bag (i.e., Bilka or Mr. Skov). This product liability action against
the supermarket is not a contractual action under Danish law.43 It's a
tort action based on Danish judge-made rules of law. I suspect the
nature of the judge-made law underlying this action was later
misunderstood by the European Court of Justice,44 but please excuse
me if I'm wrong about that.
45
Another example, also based on a real Danish case: Two Danes
prepare to go on a hunting trip. They find each other by way of a
hunting journal in Denmark. They rent a car in Scotland and buy
insurance there in accordance with Scottish law. They have an
accident, and the passenger dies due to the driver's negligence (no
question about that). The widow then tries to sue the Danish driver in
Denmark, but the defendant argues that the action is time-barred
under Scottish law, because the lawyer hired by the widow waited
more than three years before commencing legal action against the
driver. But the action is not time-barred under Danish law, because
here we have a five year statute of limitations. How should the judges
in the Danish Court of Appeal decide?
If we translate the essence of the decision – it fills no more than a
small paragraph – we see that the judges quickly list the main factors
which they found relevant, and then briefly add their conclusion (the
outcome) to that. It goes something like this: the accident occurred in
Scotland in a car registered there, and the driver was covered by

42. As did the lower (City) court judge. Id. para. 16.
43. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
44. See Skov, 2006 E.C.R. I-00199. Although a detailed explanation of the basis for my
disagreement with the ECJ ruling lies outside the scope of the present (lecture) discussion, my
main point is that a better understanding of the nature of the Danish judge-made rules of (tort)
liability by the ECJ might well have led to an interpretation of Article 13 of the Product
Liability Directive which preserved the viability of the Danish (middleman-liability) rule. See
infra note 56 and accompanying text.
45. Based on the decision of the Danish High Court, reported in [B] UGESKRIFT FOR
RETSVÆSEN 886 (1982).
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compulsory Scottish insurance. For these reasons, the dispute should
46
be governed by Scottish law, and so the action is time-barred.
Now you might not like the reasoning or the result, but you have
to think about it. In the well-considered view of one Danish professor
(who later became a Danish Supreme Court judge), the outcome
(time-bar) in this case was hardly "dictated" by the formalistic
application of choice-of-law rules. Quite the contrary: the outcome
was quite likely rather the result of pragmatic considerations and the
47
principle of reasonableness.
In other words, it was not so much a question of how to make the
(formal) choice of law between Scottish and Danish law (and their
respective time-bars), but rather a question of how to reach the
"best" result, i.e., the most reasonable result, or the "least unfair"
result. Should the court let the widow suffer because of the negligence
of the driver? Or should it let the driver suffer because the widow
chose a lawyer who took no action against that driver until the
insurance protecting him had expired?48 Tough decision. The judges
in the Danish High Court of Appeal made what they thought was the
"right call," and they could do it that way because the applicable
(Danish) judge-made rule of private international law was flexible, so
as not to "dictate" an unreasonable result in a difficult situation. I
can't give you all the details of this, I haven't got the time. Too many
of you will leave if I did it.
This was, at any rate, the (pre-EU) way Danish judges used to
handle many cases like these. If we imagine a time-line depicting the
development of Danish private law, we would see how Denmark

46. For a more accurate translation, see JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY & KETILBJORN HERTZ, EUPIL. EUROPEAN UNION PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTRACT AND TORT
(forthcoming 2009), which reads as follows:
The accident occurred in Scotland while [defendant] and [plaintiff] used a car
registered in that country, which was covered by compulsory liability insurance
according to Scots law. Therefore, the dispute should be governed by Scots law.
The [plaintiffs] are debarred from starting legal proceedings in Scotland pursuant to
section 17 of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, as the statutory
3-year period has elapsed. The High Court finds that this provision cannot be
disregarded in proceedings commenced in a Danish court even though it is [or at
least was, when this decision was rendered] a procedural rule under Scots law.
Consequently, the High Court finds for [the defendant].
47. See Jørgen Nørregard in [B] UGESKRIFT FOR RETSVÆSEN 47 (1985). "Should the fact
that the lawyer chosen by the plaintiff (herself) did nothing (for more than 3 years) affect the
outcome of the plaintiff's case, especially considering that this same failure removed the
defendant from the shelter of Scottish insurance coverage?"
48. Id.

LOOKOFSKY__FMT4.DOC

2008]

11/19/2008 4:37:13 PM

DESPERATELY SEEKING SUBSIDIARITY

181

moved from a period where we made all our own laws to the year
when Denmark joined the EC. That was in 1972. Twenty years later,
the concept of subsidiarity was introduced in response to the Danish
"no" to the European Union (in 1992). Later, Denmark joined that
49
Union (with 4 notable "reservations" or "opt-outs"), and the Union
subsequently moved Denmark and the other Member States further
in the direction of private law federalization. Ultimately, I fear we
may get "total" private law harmonization: a European Civil Code.
We are certainly moving in that direction.50
I'm in the minority on this, one of the relatively few academics
resisting the creeping federalization of Danish private law. And since
we in the minority can hardly withstand the "full-court press" being
exerted by our European opponents, I know we can't win the game.
Where is this process of federalization taking us? We're moving
away from the Danish rule which simply says that contracts are
unenforceable if the enforcement would be unreasonable, taking into
account all the circumstances. That's our Contracts Act rule from
51
1976. Here's where we're going: to a list of 17 presumptively unfair
terms from Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts.52
That's the way the EU does things like that, by listing detailed
examples. They tell you, "this is unfair, this is unfair, this unfair" and
so on. To be sure, we in Denmark don't necessarily disagree with
these EU details. We'd agree, for example, that arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts are presumptively unfair.53 But we don't want to
clutter our Contracts Act and "pollute" its legislative simplicity with
all these details. So Denmark and Sweden decided to implement the
Directive of Unfair Contract Terms without including all these details,
by simply continuing to ban (all) unreasonable contract terms. We got
sued by the EC for not including the "Grey List" of seventeen (17)
unreasonable terms from the Directive in our legislative text, and
49. The recent Irish "no" to the Lisbon Treaty, supra note 8, has had the effect of
cementing the Danish opt-outs, at least for the time-being. See Bruno Waterfield, Denmark
Calls Off Vote on EU Opt-outs, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Aug. 8, 2008, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ europe/denmark/2522903/Denmark-calls-off-voteon-EU-opt-outs.html.
50. See generally Joseph Lookofsky, The Harmonization of Private and Commercial Law:
"Towards a European Civil Code," 39 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 111 (2000), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofsky14.html.
51. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
52. See Council Directive 93/13, art. 3(3), 1993 O.J. (L 095) (EC).
53. Id. at Annex (q).
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luckily we won, since the European Court of Justice agreed that our
non-inclusion of the grey list in the black letter of our statute did not
54
provide proof that we planned to ignore the list.
Now, how would our example about the salmonella-tainted eggs
turn out now that the EC court has issued a preliminary ruling on
55
that? Not the same result as before. These poor consumers cannot
sue the supermarket on the basis of our traditional judge-made rules,
because we now know, having been brought into the EC court twenty
years after our implementation of the Product Liability Directive,56
that Article 13 of the Directive does not leave room for the Danish
judge-made rules which would allow the consumers to sue the
supermarket. This is the way that the EC court interpreted the
Directive, and I think that they may have interpreted it in this way
because they didn't fully understand the nature of tort liability under
Danish judge-made law. They said we could make a supplementary
fault-based rule.57 We could also make a contractual rule, as England
has, and I think we're going to have to do it now because we need to
reinstate an action against sellers, but I doubt whether we'll get back
to our previous pro-consumer state.58
What about the decision reached by the Danish court in the case
59
of the accident in Scotland? We would not be able to make that kind
of decision anymore, at least not under Rome II.60 The judges can't
make their call as to what they think is the right decision in this kind

54. See Case C-478/99, Comm'n v. Sweden, 2002 E.C.R. I-4147, para. 24.
55. See Case C-402/03, Skov Æg v Bilka Lavprisvarehus, 2006 E.C.R. I-00199, para. 45.
56. Council Directive 1999/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10
May 1999 amending Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for
defective products, 1999 O.J. (L141/20) (EC).
57. Denmark has now done so (in a recent revision of the Danish Product Liability Act) by
basing the seller's liability on fault, although with a "reversed burden of proof" on the fault
issue – thus creating a (pro-consumer) rule which might not be able to withstand scrutiny in the
ECJ.
58. See supra note 57.
59. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
60. See Commission Regulation 864/2007, art. 4(2), 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, 44 [hereinafter
Rome II]. The purpose of the Rome II Regulation, adopted in 2007, is to harmonize (and thus
replace) the national conflict-of-laws rules previously applied by the courts of the individual EU
Member States. The Rome II Regulation will enter into force in all EU Member States except
Denmark on 11 January 2009, and the Regulation will remain inapplicable in Denmark, unless
and until Denmark withdraws its reservation to the EU treaty as regards legal and home affairs.
The Danish situation as regards the Rome II Regulation is thus the same as regards Denmark's
position vis-à-vis the Rome I Regulation. Regarding Rome I and Rome II, see generally
LOOKOFSKY AND HERTZ, supra note 46.
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of case, because the EU wants to have more "certainty" when it
comes to choice of law. They want every judge in the European
Union to make the same decision – it doesn't matter whether it's a
good decision or a good result. They want all judges in a situation like
this to base their decision on lex communis. Since the two parties
concerned come from Denmark, it should be Danish law which
applies, so the action would not be time-barred today.61
I'm overdramatizing to be sure. But, I don't like the idea that we
cannot continue to decide a case like this on the basis of what is right:
on the basis of the result, by putting the result before the more
technical premises. In fact, I have even complained to the Ministry of
Justice, arguing that the Rome I Regulation (on the law applicable in
contractual matters)62 would put us into a "straight jacket." And the
same certainly goes for Rome II (on the law applicable in tort).63
Unfortunately, I don't have time to tell you more about that.
The global situation, at least, is better. The global situation is
better because it's more flexible. Denmark ratified the New York
Convention,64 as did the United States, and the Convention requires
that each Contracting State recognize an arbitration agreement "in
writing."65 There's a big debate about this rule these days (those of
you who do arbitration know about this): what's "in writing," and
what's not? We in Denmark don't much care, since under Danish law,
no agreement (of any kind) needs to be in writing. And luckily most
people interpret the New York Convention to allow for that. You
must at least respect arbitration agreements in writing, but you can
also respect arbitration agreements which are not in writing.66
At the global level of commercial harmonization we also have
the CISG— the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods. I'll just mention Article 16 (in CISG Part II) which says until

61. See Rome II, supra note 60, art. 4(2). There is a narrow safety valve in Article 4(3) of
the Rome II Regulation, id. art. 4(3), which would hardly affect the outcome in a case like this.
See LOOKOFSKY & HERTZ, supra note 46.
62. See Europa, Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome
Convention), http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33109.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
63. See Europa, The law applicable to non-contractual obligations – The Rome II
Regulation, http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l16027.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
64. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21, U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
65. Id. art. II.
66. See U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Law, Report of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law on the Work of Its Thirty-Ninth Session, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/61/17
(June 19-July 7, 2006).
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a contract is concluded an offer may be revoked. And you know
about this rule - it's similar to the American (Common law) rule
which permits the offeror to revoke until an acceptance has been
dispatched. Well, since an offer is a kind of promise, the CISG rule
means that (some) promises are not binding. And since that runs
counter to the general Danish rule,67 Article 16 might have stood in
the way of Denmark's ratification. But the CISG allowed Denmark to
ratify subject to a reservation under Article 92, a declaration saying
we would not be bound by CISG Part II.
I myself have argued that we should retract that CISG
68
reservation, since I think it causes more harm than it's worth. But
the reservation does show that it's possible to create a system of
minimum harmonization which allows Contracting States to breathe
freely, to take account of local traditions, even as we join forces with
the larger legal world.
Where do we go from here? Should we continue to seek
subsidiary, perhaps even Desperately (with a capital D)? Well, I've
written a bit about private law harmonization with one of my Danish
colleagues,69 and we've tried to emphasize that there is, as yet, no real
subsidiary in Europe – nor has any cost-benefit analysis been
undertaken, so as to determine whether these harmonizations are
"profitable" or otherwise necessary.
But, as I've said, we skeptics are in the minority. Most jurists in
Europe are seeking (or at least content with) more harmonization;
70
some are even seeking a European Civil Code. The jurists who
prefer to emphasize the virtues of harmonization are numerous and
71
well-organized, and so I think the skeptical minority is quite likely to
lose.
Fortunately, I've got an alternative to my desperate (and
probably futile) search for subsidiarity. It's what you might call my

67. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
68. See generally Joseph Lookofsky, Alive and Well in Scandinavia: CISG Part II, 18 J.L. &
COM. 289 (1999).
69. See Mads Bryde Andersen & Joseph Lookofsky, Nationale Aftaleregler og EUIntegration: Problemer & Lǿsningsmodeller, UGESKRIFT FOR RETSVǼSEN, Dept. B., p. 211
(2002).
70. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. But see generally Pierre Legrand, Against a
European Civil Code, 60 MOD. L. REV. 44 (1997).
71. See, e.g., Study Group on a European Civil Code, supra note 33.
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Danish "Plan B," and it's simply this: Don't worry, be happy! As I
72
said earlier in this lecture, we Danes are Number One in that.
I'm going to stop here and just tell you this: I have wonderful
memories of my five visits at Duke and of the great times that I spent
with Herbert Bernstein and with his wife Waltraud and my wife
Vibeke. We were a nice foursome. And we were together in many
places: in Hamburg, New York, Athens, Bristol, and – last but not
least – here at Duke Law.
Thank you very much.

72. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.

